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Yakov Ben-Haim
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Abstract: Strategic uncertainty is the disparity between what one
knows, and what one needs to know in order to make a responsible
decision; it permeates defense decision-making. Because of strategic
uncertainty, planners must maximize the robustness against surprise
in striving to achieve critical goals. This article describes the decision
methodology known as “robust-satisfying” and the integration of
this method with other military decision-making processes.

F

lipping a fair coin has equal chance of getting heads or tails.
Rolling a balanced dice has equal probabilities for each of six
known outcomes. But if we take this into the realm of strategic
decision-making and consider the 2002 assessment of Iraqi capability
with Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), how many outcomes should
we ponder: what are they and what are their likelihoods? One might say
the answer is binary: “Either they do or they do not have WMD.” Or,
perhaps we should consider multiple possibilities: “They have small (or
large) quantities, they are (or are not) developing more, and they intend
to use it (or not).” It is as though we are rolling dice without knowing
how many faces each die has, and whether or not each is balanced for
equal probabilities of all outcomes. This is essentially the problem every
strategist faces, and the one this article proposes to address.
We often are justified in thinking probabilistically and in saying
something is very likely. For example, Stalin’s military advisers in 1941
claimed a German invasion of the Soviet Union was very likely. The
advisers had reconnaissance evidence, captured documents, and more.1
Most analysts (though not Stalin) readily acknowledged the complementary assertion – Germany is not about to invade Russia – was very
unlikely.
In binary logic, an assertion is either true or false. If we know an
assertion is true, then we know the negation of that assertion is false.
There is an “excluded middle” in binary logic. The excluded middle
rules out the possibility an assertion is both true and false. Probabilistic
thinking is an extension – to the domain of uncertainty – of the binary
thinking of pure logic: If we know an assertion is highly probable, then
we know the negation of that assertion is highly unlikely. An assertion
and its negation cannot both be highly likely when using probabilistic
reasoning.

1      Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won, 2nd ed. (London: Pimlico, 2006), 80.

Yakov Ben-Haim is a
professor of mechanical
engineering and holds
the Yitzhak Moda’i
Chair in Technology
and Economics at the
Technion–Israel Institute
of Technology. He initiated info-gap decision
theory for modeling
and managing severe
uncertainty. Info-gap
theory is applied around
the world in engineering,
biological conservation,
economics, project
management, natural
hazard response, national
security, medicine, and
other areas.

64

Parameters 45(3) Autumn 2015

In strategic affairs, we often do not know enough about the situation
to exclude the middle as we routinely do in binary logic and in probabilistic thinking. The British during World War II could have viewed the
assertion that Germany was trying to build an atomic bomb as “quite
likely” (indeed they were). Otto Hahn, who was a war-time professor in
Berlin, had visited Enrico Fermi during the latter’s experiments with
uranium in the 1930s, and Hahn won the 1944 Nobel Prize in Chemistry
(awarded in 1945) for his discovery of fission of heavy nuclei.2 But one
could argue the Nazis abjured “Jewish physics,” such as relativity and
quantum theory, and therefore it is “quite unlikely” Germany would try
to exploit this physics in order to build an atom bomb. Indeed, the Nazis
never pursued nuclear weapons as enthusiastically as the Allies.
If one needs to say an assertion is both quite likely and quite
unlikely, one must abandon the binary structure of probability. This
need arises quite often in strategic affairs. One reason is conflicting
intelligence reports are common, as the Prussian military thinker Carl
von Clausewitz emphasized.3 Another reason is we often are unaware
of, or do not understand, new doctrinal or technological possibilities.
For instance, the possibility and implications of massive infantry use
of hand-held Sagger anti-tank ordnance surprised the Israelis in the
Yom Kippur War, despite their experiences with similar missiles both
as users and as targets.4 Furthermore, prediction is always difficult, especially in war. For example, P.M.H. Bell discusses the unpredictability of
Stalingrad as a turning point in the war, whose outcome was uncertain
even in 1944.5
The uncertainty confronting the strategic planner is often less structured and less well characterized than probabilistic uncertainty. We will
define strategic uncertainty as the disparity between what we do know and what
we need to know in order to make a responsible decision. Strategic uncertainty is
a functionally important information-gap, and it has two elements. First,
the domain of possibilities is unbounded and poorly characterized. This
is different from probabilistic uncertainty where we know the domain of
possible outcomes (even though this domain may be huge and complex).
The second element of strategic uncertainty is that it is functionally
important because it impacts the outcome of a decision. We are explicitly
concerned with outcomes, and with uncertainties that may jeopardize
critical goals or may be exploited to achieve desired outcomes.

Doing Our Best: Optimization is Not What it Seems

Managing strategic uncertainty is difficult. The successful response
to strategic uncertainty is to acknowledge it and to struggle with it, but
to recognize that strategic uncertainty is ineradicable.
The pervasiveness of uncertainty has profound implications
for what it means to do one’s best in many areas, including military
2      Nobelprize.org, “The Nobel Prize in Chemistry 1944: Otto Hahn,” http://www.nobelprize.
org/nobel_prizes/chemistry/laureates/1944.
3      Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Book One, trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1984), 117.
4      Meir Finkel, On Flexibility: Recovery from Technological and Doctrinal Surprise on the Battlefield, trans.
by Moshe Tlamim (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 29, 155, 156, 179.
5      P.M.H. Bell, Twelve Turning Points of the Second World War (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2011), 95, 231.
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strategy. The decision methodology, which could be called outcomeoptimization, begins by identifying the best available information,
understanding, and insight, including perhaps assessments of uncertainty. We will call this information our knowledge. This knowledge
entails information and understanding about friendly and adversarial
capabilities, geopolitical constraints and opportunities, terrain, logistics,
etc. Outcome-optimization chooses the option whose knowledge-based
predicted outcome is best.
Outcome-optimization is usually unsatisfactory for decision-making
when facing strategic uncertainty because our knowledge is likely wrong
in important respects. Instead, we will advocate the decision methodology of “robustly satisfying” outcome requirements.6 The basic idea is to
identify outcomes that are essential – goals that must be achieved – and
then to choose the decision that will achieve those critical outcomes
over the greatest range of future surprises.
We use our knowledge in two ways. First, to assess the putative
desirability of the alternative decisions, and second, to evaluate the vulnerability of those alternatives to surprising future developments. The
robust-satisfying strategy is the one with maximal power against strategic uncertainty while satisfying critical requirements. In other words,
the outcome will be satisfactory, though not necessarily optimal, over
the greatest range of future deviations from our current understanding.
Of course, what constitutes a satisfactory outcome can be as modest or
as ambitious as one wants.
A simple preliminary example is the robust satisfying response to
a surprise attack. The immediate critical goals are to protect and stabilize the attacked force and to assess the strength and deployment of
the attacking force. Actions are taken that depend minimally on the
limited and uncertain knowledge about the attacker. Uncertainty about
the attacker will usually preclude an immediate attempt to achieve an
optimal outcome such as annihilating the attacker. Subsequently, the
critical goals change and the response evolves accordingly.
Colin Gray expressed something very close to the idea of robust
satisfying when he wrote:
You cannot know today what choices in defense planning you should make
that will be judged correct in ten or 20 years’ time. Why? Because one cannot
know what is unknowable. Rather than accept a challenge that is impossible
to meet, however, pick one that can be met well enough. Specifically, develop
policy-makers, defense planners, and military executives so that they are
intellectually equipped to find good enough solutions to the problems that
emerge or even erupt unpredictably years from now. … The gold standard
for good enough defense planning is to get the biggest decisions correct
enough so that one’s successors will lament ‘if only ...’ solely with regard to
past errors that are distinctly survivable.7

The goal of the methodology we are calling “robust-satisfying” is to
achieve specified critical objectives reliably. This is different from attempting
6      Further discussion of ideas in this section are found in Yakov Ben-Haim, “Strategy Selection:
An Info-Gap Methodology,” Defense & Security Analysis 30, no. 2 (2014): 106-119. Robust-satisfying
is central in info-gap decision theory. See Yakov Ben-Haim, Info-Gap Decision Theory: Decisions Under
Severe Uncertainty, 2nd ed. (London: Academic Press, 2006).
7      Colin S. Gray, “War - Continuity in Change, and Change in Continuity,” Parameters 40, no. 2
(Summer 2010): 6, 9.
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to achieve the best possible outcome. Charles Freilich described a
closely related idea in analyzing Israeli formulation of military strategy
in Lebanon:
We have thus adopted a different criterion of success as the measure of a
DMP [decision-making process]: not the quality of the outcome, but the
degree to which decision makers achieved their objectives. The central argument is not that Israel would have achieved better outcomes had the process
been better, but that the prospects of it actually achieving its objectives
would have increased significantly.8

Robustness against strategic uncertainty, or simply robustness, is
the core of the methodology we are describing. A strategy is robust to
uncertainty if the specified outcome requirements are achieved even if
the future evolves very differently from our anticipations. A strategy is
highly robust if critical goals are achieved despite great surprise or large
error in our understanding. Low robustness means the goals are jeopardized if the future deviates even slightly from the predictions based on
our knowledge.
Three components make up an information-gap robust-satisfying
decision. The first component is our information, understanding, and
insight about relevant situations, what we are calling our knowledge.
Second, we specify the goals that must be achieved, without which the
outcome is not acceptable or good enough or not distinctly survivable.
Third, we identify those aspects of the first two elements – the knowledge and the goals – that are uncertain, about which we might be wrong
or ignorant.
These three components – knowledge, goals, and uncertainties –
are combined in assessing the robustness of any proposed strategy. The
robustness of a specified strategy is the greatest uncertainty that can
be tolerated without falling short of the goals. Robustness is the greatest degree of error, in knowledge and goals, which does not prevent
achievement of the goals.

First Example: Epaminondas’s Feint

We will use the Theban-Spartan Wars of the 4th century BCE as
a brief illustration of the method. Keegan describes the situation as
follows:
Thebes won two remarkable victories, at Leuctra in 371 and Mantinea in
362, where its outstanding general, Epaminondas, demonstrated that the
phalanx system could be adapted to achieve decisive tactical manoeuvre
in the face of the enemy. At Leuctra, outnumbered 11,000 to 6000, he
quadrupled the strength of his left wing and, masking his weakness on the
right, led his massed column in a charge. Expecting the battle to develop
in normal phalanx style, when both sides met in equal strength along the
whole front of engagement, the Spartans failed to reinforce the threatened
section in time and were broken, for considerable loss to themselves and
almost none to the Thebans. Despite this warning, they allowed themselves
to be surprised in exactly the same fashion at Mantinea nine years later and
were again defeated.9
8      Charles D. Freilich, “Israel In Lebanon—Getting It Wrong: The 1982 Invasion, 2000
Withdrawal, and 2006 War,” Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs 6, no. 3 (2012): 69.
9      John Keegan, A History of Warfare (London: Pimlico, 1994), 258. See also John David Lewis,
Nothing Less than Victory: Decisive Wars and the Lessons of History (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2010), 52.
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A Spartan robust-satisfying analysis would begin by identifying the
Spartan goal. Given the balance of force favoring the Spartans nearly
2-to-1, the goal could reasonably have been routing the Thebans.
One then outlines the relevant knowledge. This knowledge would
include intelligence about enemy strength, plans of battle, weapons and
tactics, weather, terrain, and so on.
One then identifies the domains of uncertainty, which can be numerous. How confident are we in the intelligence about enemy strength?
Might enemy allies be lurking in the region? Is the intended field of
battle truly flat and unimpeded?
These three components – the goal, the knowledge, and the uncertainties – are then combined in assessing the robustness to error or
surprise of any proposed Spartan plan of battle. This is not a simple task
(hindsight is a tremendous aid).
The analysis of a proposed decision centers on the “robustness question” which is: how large an error or surprise can the proposed plan
tolerate without falling short of the goal? The question being asked is
not “how wrong are we?” but rather “how large an error can we tolerate?” These are very different questions, and only the second question
is answerable with our current knowledge. Furthermore, the question
is not “what is the best possible outcome?” but rather “what is the
most robust plan for achieving our goals?” These questions also differ
fundamentally, and the latter is far more relevant when facing strategic
uncertainty.
We will not perform the robustness analysis on all the dimensions
of uncertainty. We will focus on the Spartan uncertainty about Theban
tactics. The standard tactical model, as Keegan explains, was uniform
frontal assault of phalanxes leading to close fighting with swords and
spears. The robustness question for the Spartans is: how large a Theban
deviation from this combat model would deny Spartan victory? If the
Spartans were confident that a 2-to-1 force ratio was sufficient for
victory, then a local 2-to-1 Theban force concentration entails significant Spartan vulnerability. Given the overall Spartan force advantage,
a robust tactic for the Spartans would be to hold significant reserve to
either bolster Spartan forces against Theban concentration or to exploit
points of Theban weakness.
The point of this example is not to claim that holding force in
reserve is a good tactic. The point is the type of reasoning: identify
goals, knowledge and uncertainties, and then maximize one’s robustness against surprise. Do not ask for the best outcome; ask for the best
robustness in achieving specified outcomes (that may be very ambitious).
One is optimizing something (the robustness) but not what is often the
aim of optimization (the substantive outcome).
Strategic uncertainty motivates the robust-satisfying methodology:
optimize one’s immunity against surprise, rather than trying to optimize
the quality of the outcome. Routing the Thebans on the day of battle is
less than a Spartan general might desire: totally destroying their force,
their will to fight, their allies’ support, the economic base of their future
resistance, etc. Routing the Thebans, we suppose in this example, would
constitute success or victory or at least be good enough, and the aim of
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the robust-satisfying analysis is to achieve this outcome as reliably as
possible. What one optimizes is the reliability of a good enough outcome
(which can be chosen as ambitiously or as modestly as one wants).
The analysis would continue by examining the vulnerability to additional uncertainties and the robustness obtained from alternative plans
of battle. The analysis is neither simple, nor fast, nor free of the need for
deliberation and judgment. However, the process identifies a plan that
will achieve the specified goals over the widest range of surprise by the
adversary and error in our knowledge.

Trade-off in Force Development: An Israeli Example

Military planners often face a trade-off, given limited budgets,
between the ability to apply force, and the ability to identify threats and
targets for that force. Neither alone would be effective. More generically, the trade-off is between different but complementary military
capabilities. For example, John Gordon and Jerry Sollinger write that
“the Army’s essential problem is the changing relationship between air
and ground forces at the high-end of the conflict spectrum, especially
the appeal stand-off (usually air-delivered) precision munitions have to
risk-averse decisionmakers.”10
The attractiveness of airpower over landpower was illustrated in
the Israeli “Defensive Pillar” operation in Gaza (November 14 to 21,
2012). Massive landpower was deployed at the border, but operations
were terminated after eight days of precise aerial munition and naval
artillery attack without land action. As Lukas Milevski explains in a different context, “Landpower exclusively may take and exercise control,”
but “landpower, of all tools of power, faces the greatest impediments,
risks, and dangers in its use.”11 Critics of Israel’s cease-fire pointed out
Hamas retained considerable assets – rockets and launchers hidden in
civilian areas – that could be destroyed only by invasion. The response
to these critics was that invasion would entail significant civilian and
military casualties and international condemnation.
Choosing between two options, motivated by the Israeli experience,
will illustrate the robust-satisfying methodology in response to strategic
uncertainty.12
1. Massive investment in aerial delivery systems and instrumented intelligence sources, as well as sensor capabilities for threat detection and
munitions control, would enable effective focused use of aerial and
artillery power. Landpower is needed only in a supporting role. We
will call this option “aerial intel and delivery.” This would leverage the
strong Israeli hi-tech capabilities.
2. Extensive landpower with supporting airpower are essential for
defense and control of territory because Israel has almost no strategic depth separating major civilian populations from international
borders, and is thus extremely vulnerable to invasion. We will call this
10     John Gordon IV and Jerry Sollinger, “The Army’s Dilemma,” Parameters 34, no. 2 (Summer
2004): 43.
11     Lukas Milevski, “Fortissimus Inter Pares: The Utility of Landpower in Grand Strategy,”
Parameters 42, no. 2 (Summer 2012): 14.
12     More extensive discussion of this example is found in Ben-Haim, “Strategy Selection: An
Info-Gap Methodology.”
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the landpower option.
An Israeli strategist might reason as follows in selecting between
these options, drawing on experience in Lebanon and Gaza over the past
decade.13 We will not present a comprehensive analysis of these operations. We consider a simplified planning problem in order to illustrate
the robust-satisfying method for strategic planning. Different judgments
might be made in a real-life situation.
The major security challenges in coming years arise from missile
bombardment of Israeli cities and towns by non-state actors. The threat
of land invasion by a national army is small though not negligible.
Consequently, the preferred response by risk-averse elected officials, and
due to international constraints, focuses on neutralizing incoming missiles, extensive intelligence on the adversaries’ capabilities, and pin-point
aerial capability for eliminating enemy assets. In short, the best current
estimates indicate a clear preference for the aerial intel and delivery platform over the use of landpower.
However, the best current estimates of future security challenges
are highly uncertain. The fluid nature of geo-politics in the region can
cause rapid change in the dominant security challenges. Degradation of
conventional landpower would be disastrous in the case of major theater
war against several regional states. Under-development of landpower
could even induce traditional war as deterrence erodes, even though
current understanding makes such a scenario unlikely. Unanticipated
threats (e.g., attack tunnels or massive rocket capabilities) could necessitate response by ground forces. In short, the most reasonable option
– aerial intel and delivery – is also the riskiest given the strategic uncertainty about future political and military developments in the immediate
region and beyond.
We now outline the three elements of the robust-satisfying analysis:
the knowledge, the goal, and the uncertainties. We then specify two
alternative options available to the planner and draw conclusions about
robustness and the prioritization of the options.
Our understanding of the situation – the knowledge – is that adversaries have two alternative modes of attack. The much more plausible
mode is to support informal non-state actors engaging in frequent but
fluctuating missile bombardment of civilian populations. Large arsenals
can be provided to these non-state actors, who have high motivation and
ability to cause injury and damage and to seriously disrupt civilian life.
The much less plausible mode of attack is conventional war with land
forces and supporting air power. Major injury and damage would result
from unrestrained conventional war.
The goal is to maintain, in the civilian population, a sense of personal security and normality in daily life or, equivalently, to prevent what
Shamir and Hecht called psychological exhaustion of the populace.14
This is operationalized by requiring a low level of loss of life, injury or
damage to property. (We ignore other goals in this analysis.)
13      2nd Lebanon War, 12 July to 14 August 2006; Operation Cast Lead, 27 December 2008 to
17 January 2009. Operation Pillar of Defense, 14 to 21 November 2012. Operation Protective Edge,
8 July to 26 August 2014.
14      Eitan Shamir and Eado Hecht, “A War Examined, Gaza 2014: Israel’s Attrition vs Hamas’
Exhaustion,” Parameters 44, no. 4 (Winter 2014-15): 85.
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Four issues are subject to strategic uncertainty. First, the likelihood
of conventional war seems small but non-negligible and it is imprecisely
known. Neighboring countries maintain substantial standing armies with
offensive capabilities. Future geo-political developments could quickly
change the likelihood of war. What seems implausible might actually be
quite likely due to unknown future developments. Second, future missile
range, payload, accuracy and quantity employed by non-state actors will
improve at unknown rates. Third, instrumented intelligence can greatly
enhance weapon effectiveness. However, the extent to which instrumented intelligence provides thorough understanding of the adversary
is highly uncertain. The adversary’s goals, morale or organization may
change in unknown ways. These first three uncertainties relate to the
knowledge. The fourth uncertainty is that the civilian population may,
in the future, become less tolerant to loss of life, injury or damage. Thus
the goal is uncertain.
Having outlined the knowledge, the goal, and the uncertainties,
we now specify two alternative options, and subsequently assess their
robustness.
The first option, aerial intel and delivery, is designed to reduce drastically the disruption of civilian life from non-state missile bombardment
by continuous interdiction of missile attack and by targeted elimination of enemy assets. Supported by solid land capability, the knowledge
predicts that this option plausibly provides acceptably low loss of life,
injury or damage in response to either mode of enemy attack. Ignoring
uncertainty for the moment, the knowledge indicates that this option
would be acceptable.
The second option, landpower, is primarily designed to repulse a
conventional invasion and to bring the conflict into enemy territory
quickly. This option is less effective than aerial intel and delivery against
low-level non-state missile attack. Major landpower can be employed
to eliminate such activity by invasion and control of territory, but the
threshold for action is necessarily rather high. Consequently our knowledge predicts that more loss of life, injury or damage is the plausible
outcome of landpower. Again ignoring uncertainty for now, our knowledge indicates that landpower is less acceptable than aerial intel and
delivery. If we knew the knowledge to be correct, we would prefer aerial
intel and delivery over landpower. Aerial intel and delivery would be
the preferred option based on the outcome optimization methodology
discussed earlier.

Assessment

We are now in a position to assess the robustness (to uncertainty) of
each option, for achieving the goal despite strategic uncertainty in both
the knowledge and the goal. The discussion will briefly focus on four
general and inter-related conclusions.
First, predicted outcomes are not a reliable basis for selecting an
option. Our knowledge is quite likely wrong, so knowledge-based
predictions may err greatly and thus are not a reliable basis for prioritizing the available options. Like the Spartans’ error in their war against
Thebes, it would be an error to suppose that the future can be reliably predicted from the past or from what now looks most plausible.

Thinking Strategically

Ben-Haim

71

Selecting aerial intel and delivery because it is predicted, by our knowledge, to yield a better outcome than landpower, is unreliable because the
knowledge is uncertain and likely wrong in significant ways. In contrast,
the robust-satisfying approach is to select the option that would achieve
the specified goals with the greatest robustness against uncertainty in
the knowledge.
Second, goals that are more numerous or quantitatively more
demanding, are also more vulnerable (less robust) to strategic uncertainty. For example, if the goal is to prevent both civilian casualties and
property damage, then more contingencies can prevent achievement of
the goal, than if the goal is only to prevent casualties. Similarly, the goal
of preventing all civilian casualties can fail in more ways, and is thus
less robust, than the goal of keeping casualties below a threshold, say 5
per year. We can summarize this by saying that more demanding and
ambitious goals are more vulnerable to surprise. We are not saying that
more audacious actions are necessarily less robust. We are saying that
striving to achieve more ambitious outcomes can fail in more ways than
striving to achieve less. A standard approach – optimizing the substantive outcome – would favor achieving more rather than less. In contrast,
the robust-satisfying approach tries to achieve specified goals despite
inevitable surprises along the way.
Third, the option that is preferable, based on its predicted outcome,
may in fact be less robust than other alternatives for achieving the goal.
This was true in the Theban wars, where uniform deployment of the
Spartan phalanxes was disastrous for Sparta. The choice between aerial
intel and delivery, and landpower, is more complicated. Aerial intel
and delivery looks better than landpower because the knowledge predicts better outcomes with aerial intel and delivery. If the goal is very
demanding (e.g., no casualties), then aerial intel and delivery may be the
only feasible option and it will be more robust than landpower which
would not reach the goal even if the knowledge is correct. This has two
implications. First, the robustness of aerial intel and delivery for achieving a very demanding goal will be small, so perhaps the goal should
be re-examined. The robustness analysis reveals situations in which
existing capabilities can’t reliably deliver the goals; consequently, the
goals may need to be modified. Second, as a goal is relaxed (e.g. accepting greater loss of life or property), landpower becomes more robust
against surprise. In short, the robust prioritization of options may differ
from the prioritization based on outcome optimization. That is, landpower may be more robust than aerial intel and delivery for achieving
specified goals, even though aerial intel and delivery is predicted (by our
knowledge) to have a better outcome. Furthermore, the actual choice
depends on the goals. Very demanding goals (very low civilian injury
and damage) will indicate aerial intel and delivery, while less demanding
goals will indicate landpower.
Finally, the analysis identifies and clarifies the implications of central
judgments that must be made. The info-gap robust-satisfying analysis is
a conceptual framework for deliberation, judgment, and selection of an
option.
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Conclusion

The future will often be surprising because current knowledge and
understanding are incomplete or deficient in functionally important
ways. Strategic uncertainty is the disparity between what one knows,
and what one needs to know in order to make a responsible decision.
Strategic uncertainty permeates defense policymaking and strategic
planning.
Planners and decision-makers for strategic issues must do their best,
but this does not mean achieving the best conceivable outcome. Political
rhetoric aside, strategic planners must identify critical goals – outcomes
that must be achieved, without which the result would be unacceptable – and then choose a decision that will achieve those goals over
the widest range of surprise. Referring to the aerial intel and delivery/
landpower example discussed earlier, we can contrast conventional
outcome-optimization, with the proposed robust-satisfying approach.
Conventionally one says: Use your best knowledge to predict outcomes,
and then adopt the plan whose outcome is predicted to be best. Aerial
intel and delivery was predicted to have lower cost than landpower, and
thus to be preferred by the outcome-optimizer. However, the prevalence
of strategic uncertainty means that our knowledge is wrong is important
and unknown ways. This undermines the reliability and usefulness of
such predictions. The robust-satisfying approach in choosing between
aerial intel and delivery and landpower begins by imagining how our
knowledge could err. One then chooses the option that would cause no
more than acceptable loss over the widest range of deviation between
our expectations and what the future could bring. Because of strategic
uncertainty, planners should maximize the robustness against surprise
in striving to achieve critical goals. It is unrealistic, and may be irresponsible, to try to maximize the substantive value of the outcome itself.
We described the decision methodology of robust-satisfying and its
three components (knowledge, goals, and uncertainties), and illustrated
the prioritization of decision options with two examples. The methodology is relevant to many challenges facing the United States.
Consider US coordination with a friendly state, in competition with
a neighboring state that can project both land and marine power. A
“competitive strategies” model argues that landpower development by
the friendly state could threaten the competitor’s border and draw the
competitor away from maritime competition with the United States. In
contrast, a “strategic partnership” model argues that friendly maritime
development could assist US efforts to protect the maritime commons
against the competitor.
Difficulty in establishing a US policy preference derives in part
from uncertainty in the relative validity of these two models. Friendly
landpower buildup could, unlike the competitive strategies prediction,
drive the competitor to maritime buildup as a path of least resistance for
power projection. Or, friendly maritime growth could, unlike the strategic partnership anticipation, lead to re-doubled maritime competition in
response to augmented maritime challenges. Strategic uncertainty dominates this policy selection, and weighs against choosing the strategy with
the best predicted outcome. The robust-satisfying approach chooses the
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strategy that can tolerate the greatest error without jeopardizing specified outcome requirements.
A robust-satisfying analysis is readily integrated with other tools
for military decision-making. For example, in identifying “prudent risks
to exploit opportunities” the commander must “analyze and minimize
as many hazards as possible.”15 This hazard analysis can be operationalized by assessing the robustness against uncertain threats. Likewise,
assessing the risk of a threat can be based on the estimated “probability
of occurrence and the severity of consequences once the occurrence
happens.”16 These estimates are uncertain and their robustness to error
can be evaluated. Similarly, Courses of Action (COAs) can be compared
by using a decision matrix of weights and ratings of each COA for each
relevant criterion.17 The COA assessment can be evaluated for its robustness to uncertainty in these numerical weights and ratings.
Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, recognizes that a
COA should “provide the most flexibility to meet unexpected threats
and opportunities.”18 Flexibility can be assessed systematically in terms
of robustness to uncertainty in these threats and opportunities. For
instance, the assessment of “advantages and disadvantages” of each COA
should include evaluation of their robustness to surprise.19 Finally, our
skepticism about outcome-optimization suggests caution in interpreting
the task of defeating “the enemy COA that is of the most concern to the
commander.”20 It is usually unrealistic to think that one has identified
the most dangerous threat; doing so probably rests on the untenable
assumption that the future will mimic the past. Furthermore, countering the most dangerous enemy COA does not guarantee effectiveness
against the full range of enemy capabilities because answering the most
dangerous threat may not answer other threats at all. A robust-satisfying
analysis provides a more systematic approach to the management of
strategic uncertainty.

15    US Department of the Army, The Operations Process, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 5-0
(Washington, DC: US Department of the Army, May 17, 2012), 14. See also US Department of the
Army, The Operations Process, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0 (Washington, DC:
US Department of the Army, May 17, 2012), 4-2.
16    US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operation Planning, Joint Publication (JP) 5-0 (Washington, DC:
US Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), IV-11.
17     Ibid., G-1.
18     Ibid., IV-39.
19     Ibid., IV-37.
20     Ibid., IV-36.

